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THE RULES OF LIABILITY

Directors of large corporations are sometimes compared, with
considerable justice, to the supreme party council in a one-party
state. Potentates of countries commonly regarded as dictatorial
might look with envy on American corporate directors not only for
the funds of money of which they dispose, but also for the security
of their tenure.' But there are many ways in which directors are unlike
a dictatorial presidium. One of the distinctions, and perhaps the most
important, is directors' liability to pay damages when they make
mistakes.2 Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., writing of the "failure of
directors to direct," has declared that "the only legal deterrent to
such conduct, and perhaps the only deterrent of any sort, is the fear
'3
of civil liability. '
The civil liability of directors may be usefully divided for analysis
into two parts. The first part is liability for self-serving conduct-for
example, by paying themselves excessive compensation, or by making
contracts favorable to their own interests. The second part is liability
for negligence-for example, by making an unwise investment based
upon an incorrect financial statement. It is the latter type of liability
that this article will discuss.
Negligence liability may, in turn, be divided into two parts. One
of these is directors' liability to the corporation for any failure to
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manage its affairs with normal skill and diligence.' The other is directors' liability to securities buyers and to creditors for any failure to
state with reasonable accuracy the state of affairs of the company;'
the most prominent example of this type of liability is that imposed
by section 11 of the federal Securities Act of 1933.6 There are various
other types of negligence liability-such as liability to creditors for
incurring debts beyond the corporation's probable ability to pay, and
for deceiving creditors by issuing misleading financial statements 7-which are omitted from the present discussion in the belief
that the questions which they present are fundamentally similar to
those presented by liability under the Securities Act.

What this article will examine is not the excellence of the principles of conduct which these rules express, but the human behavior
4. A few classic cases involving liability to the corporation, the facts of which will be
referred to in the ensuing discussion, include:
Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920). Even though dwindling assets and remarks by
informants might have prompted an earlier investigation, the cashier of a small bank embezzled
funds over a period of years. The president was held liable, and the other directors were
vindicated.
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). A corporation had failed because it had
continued to pay salaries to executives and other employees who were accomplishing nothing.
An outside director was not held liable, although he admittedly had devoted inadequate attention to the company's affairs, because it was not demonstrated that more attention would have
reduced the corporation's losses.
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Directors of a bank voted to buy Missouri
Pacific bonds under an agreement to resell them upon demand; the effect of the decision was
to insure a loss if the bonds decreased in value, but to deny any chance of gain if their value
increased and the previous owner tendered a demand for the bonds. The directors were held
liable for the loss sustained on the bonds during the period of the repurchase option.
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). A corporation failed because of the continuation of an inefficient operation at an old plant in Paterson,
N.J., instead of shifting to a more suitable facility at Colwyn, Pa., although a prospectus had
promised such a shift in operations. A finding of liability was affirmed, but the damage
assessment was remanded to determine the extent of the corporation's losses which were due
to the directors' error in delaying transfer of operations, as distinguished from other causes.
For a more extended discussion of these and other cases, see Cary & Harris, Standards of
Conduct Under Conmnon Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61
(Special Issue, Feb. 1972).
5. The outstanding example of this type of directors' liability, imposed by section I I of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 US.C. § 77k (1970), is Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Applebaum & McDowell, IndetnificationAgainst
Securities Acts Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 131 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972); Latty, Prospectus
Liability-The BarChris Case, 1970 J. Bus. LAW 65; Ruder, Wheat & Loss, Standards of
Conduct Under the FederalSecurities Acts, 27 Bus. LAW. 75 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
7. See Bystrom v. Villard, 175 App. Div. 433, 162 N.Y.S. 100 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (president
and director held liable to stock purchaser who relied upon false statements in prospectus which
defendants failed to verify). See also H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 234 (2d ed. 1970).
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which is likely to result from the rules' existence. Since the totality
of behavior responsive to the rules of liability has not been observed,
the subject will be examined by means of conjectural "models" of
behavior. One of them is a "model" in the older sense of that concatenation of consequences which would most perfectly justify the
law as it stands. The other is a "model" in the contemporary sense
of a set of hypotheses which seem likely to exist in fact.
THE MODELS OF BEHAVIOR

An Idealistic Model of Behavior
Ideally, directors might be expected to respond to the rule of
liability in the following ways:
Compliance (payingthe corporation'sor investors' losses). Whenever directors' errors which result in losses to the corporation are
detected, the directors would draw on their bank accounts and other
resources, and repay the corporation for the losses suffered;8 or, in
the case of false statements in registration procedures, directors
would reimburse the investment losses of securities buyers.' Either
type of payment would be beneficial to investors because it would
relieve them of losses occasioned by directors' errors. Consequently,
investment would be safer than otherwise, capital would become
available at lower rates of return, and production costs would be
lowered, with the ultimate benefit of lower prices or higher profits,
or both. Admittedly, a certain amount of director impoverishment
would result from this type of transfer of funds. Although this is not
in itself a virtue, director improverishment may have valuable secondary consequences, which will be noted next.
Avoidance by circumspection. In their eagerness to avoid impoverishment through compliance with the rules of liability, directors
would exercise enhanced skill and diligence in the discharge of their
duties. Consequently, corporations would become more efficient,
and, in turn, consumers and investors would receive further benefits.
A voidance by retreat. While some directors would continue to
exercise their duties with intensified care, others would perceive their
own unwillingness or ineptitude to reach the standards required and,
therefore, decide not to be directors. This consequence would grad8. This alternative was followed in Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940), and
in Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). See note 4
supra.
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ually eliminate unsuitable persons from boards of directors, so that
the efforts of those who would continue to serve would be even more
effective.
If the foregoing model accurately describes prevailing director
behavior, the existing rules of liability are working splendidly, and
there is no need to pursue the subject further. If the model appears
to be far removed from reality, however, one may usefully attempt
to hypothesize a more probable model of directors' behavior.
A Realistic Model of Directors' Behavior
Avoidance of applicationof the rule. One of the outstanding char-

acteristics of the human animal is his disposition to avoid punishment
and obtain satisfaction by circuitous means other than those contemplated by rulemakers. Circuity is indeed one of the basic arts of
business management-most conspicuous in planning transactions to
minimize tax incidence, to maximize financial resources without encountering securities regulations, and to entice customers without
violating fair trade rules. These talents, which have long been devoted
to avoiding other risks, are equally available to cope with the menace
of directors' liability.
The intensity of the impulse to avoid can only be appreciated
when the magnitude of the possible liabilities is contemplated. In a
famous case involving the maneuvers of Guaranty Trust Company to
save Alleghany Corporation, plausible claims were made for liabilities of over ten million dollars, though the court actually imposed
liability to the extent of about half a million dollars.' 0 In Selheimer
v. Manganese Corp. ofAmerica," involving a small corporation with

a capital of about half a million dollars, the lower court charged the
directors with liability for losses of 383 thousand dollars, though on
appeal the case was remanded to reduce this amount. With a normally vivid imagination, a director might then visualize losses reaching astronomic levels-for example, the mistake of the Ford directors
in manufacturing the Edsel has been estimated to have cost 350 million dollars, 2 and the mistake of duPont directors in Corfam to have
cost the company 100 million dollars.' 3 Under section I1 of the
9. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
II. 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).

12. J.

BROOKS, THE FATE OF THE EDSEL AND OTHER BUSINESS ADVENTURES

67 (1963).

13. Cooney, A Giant Stirs: DuPont Co. Planners Stake Future Growth on Current
Changes, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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Securities Act of 1933, a director could become liable for the entire
amount of the registered share issue, which could easily run into tens
of millions. 4
Who would undertake a directorship with even a moderate probability of being liable for any of these amounts in return for directors'
fees of a few thousand dollars?15 Perhaps it would not scare off Ralph
Nader, who reportedly has no wealth to lose,16 but, by the same
token, the possibility of huge losses would not deter him from negligence. Perhaps Henry Ford would not be scared off, since his concern
with preserving his billion-dollar stake in the company justifies the
risk 6f 500 million dollars; but if he could work as well through a
dummy director, that course of action would seem to be the most
sensible approach. For a moderately successful engineer, lawyer,
banker or executive, however, it would be simple improvidence to
risk losing his fortune of a few hundred thousand or a few million
dollars, when the only gain would be a few thousands in fees. If he
wants to serve his fellow men, he can acquire as much virtue with
less risk on boards of churches and Audubon societies. For the
middle class representative of blacks, women or the environmentwith a fortune consisting of an equity in a six room house and a few
thousand dollars in life insurance and children's education endowments-assuming directorial risks would be profligate. So it would
not be surprising if directors demanded an effective plan of liabilityavoidance, and gave a fair amount of thought to keeping it operative.
I. Indemnification. Directors are likely to share the propensity of
other human beings to regard their mistakes as the products of the
unforeseeability of human events, rather than as failures to exercise
the skill and care of normally prudent managers. Consequently,
directors are likely to regard it as only fair that their corporations
reimburse them for the expenses they incur in defending against
claims of negligence and for any amounts for which they may be
required to reimburse the corporation. Corporation laws have been
14. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In 1970, 1,850
corporate issues were registered with the SEC, aggregating 25 billion dollars, indicating a mean
offering amount of over 10 million dollars. 1970 SEC ANN. REP. 216.
15. See Cary & Harris, supra note 4; Garrett, Duties and Liabilities of CorporateDirectors. hitroduction-GeneralSurvey, 22 Bus. LAW. 29, 33 (1966); Hershman, supra note 2Garrett, Marsh, McDowell, Bishop, Delancey, Meara & Sebring, Symposium: Duties and
Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 22 Bus. LAW. 29, 124 (1966). See also Farrell & Murphy,
Comments on the Theme: Why Should Anyone Want to be a Director?, 27 Bus. LAW. 7
(Special Issue, Feb. 1972).
16. Meet Ralph Nader, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1968, at 65-67.
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7

and directors

can reasonably be expected to make the fullest permissible use of
them.18
There are, however, some obstacles to the indemnification proce-

dure. First, the directors who are to be reimbursed cannot vote on
their own claims; nevertheless, if there are disinterested directors,

they may be expected to hold a favorable view of their fellowdirectors, since otherwise they would not be serving on the same

board. The sympathetic attitude of disinterested directors will naturally be reinforced by the fact that they owe their positions to the
votes of the proxy committee, which usually includes the principal
executives who must have concurred in whatever decisions the board
has made. If the matter requires shareholder approval, the stockholders may be expected to vote as recommended by the directors since,
if the shareholders did not have confidence in the management, most
would have sold their shares and invested in another company,"
The second obstacle to the indemnification procedure will be the
terms of the indemnification statutes which preclude indemnification
when directors have been found to be at fault."0 However, no such

finding can be made if the case is settled before judgment. Relevant
data suggest that more than 90 percent of such cases will be termi17. Influential patterns of directors' indemnification laws are provided in ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5 (2d ed. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968); N.Y.

Bus. CORP. LAW .§ 721-27 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970). Their
origins date from 1950 (Model), 1967 (Delaware), and 1941 (New York), but each statute has
been frequently revised. For analyses of these and similar laws and their effects, see ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5, Comment (2d ed. 1971) (containing an exhaustive bibliography and statutory citations); ALI-ABA STUDY 118-37; W. KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 157-

71; G. WASHINGTON

& J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE

112-68 (1963);

Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 5; Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance
Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92, 97-102 (1966); Check, Controlof

Corporate Indemnification:A ProposedStatute, 22 VAND. L. REv. 255 (1969); Klink, Chalif,
Bishop & Arsht, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and Corporate
Bylaws, 27 Bus. LAW. 109 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972); Note, Indemnification of the Corporate
Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1970).

18. For comments on the practice of indemnification, see Garrett, Marsh, McDowell,
Bishop, DeLancey, Meara & Sebring, supra note 15, at 123-28.
19. This point of view is commonly asserted with regard to the attitudes ofsmall shareholders. See. e.g., J. LIVINGSTON, supra note I, at 22-26, 33-38 (1958); Manning, Book Review, 67
YALE L.J. 1477, 1483 (1958).
20. See ABA MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5(b) (2d ed. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 145(b) (Supp. 1968) (precluding indemnification in a derivative suit if the director has been
"adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct"). The New York statute precludes indemnifying any part of the settlement in a derivative action but allows reimbursement of defense
expenses. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(b) (McKinney 1963).
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nated prior to judgment. A survey in the 1930's and early 1940's
showed that 95 percent of shareholders' derivative suits were termi-

nated otherwise than by a judgment for the plaintiff.2' Most of these
suits were probably against directors, although the report on the

survey does not so specify. More recent data on automobile injury
litigation show that over 85 percent of the cases terminated otherwise

than by a judgment for the claimant. 2 Thus, indemnification is likely
to be permissible in 90 percent or more of the suits against directors.
Consequently, it may be hypothesized that directors will escape pay-

ment from their own pockets in a very high percentage of the cases
where claims are made and prosecuted.

2. Liability insurance. To the extent that risks of directors' negligence liability persist in spite of indemnification practice, liability

risks may be further reduced by officers' and directors' liability insurance.

3

Before the 1960's, this form of insurance seems to have been

used infrequently, 4 probably because the threat of liability was not
credible to most directors. Among the developments which stimulated the great leap forward of liability insurance, the most dramatic
was the decision of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,25 which
21. See F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING DERIVATIVE SUITS 32 (1944). Wood's
figures have been re-analyzed to eliminate the bias in his presentation. Combining the closelyheld and publicly-held corporations and eliminating the cases as to which final disposition was
unknown, 931 cases are within the category of final dispositions. Of this number, 45 (5%) were
"recoveries"; 287 (31%) were settled; 337 (36%) dismissed; and 262 (28%) discontinued. There
have been extensive changes, of course, in the law since this report, but there does not appear
to be any reason to expect a radical change in the settlement rate.
22. See CONARD, et al. 241, showing that 15 percent of filed automobile personal injury
cases reached trial, and 2 percent reached appeal. The more recent and comprehensive Department of Transportation (DOT) study does not present aggregate quantities from which a
percentage could be calculated, but presents a graphic figure which appears consistent with the
Conard report. The DOT study also presents a graphic figure dividing the cases reaching trial
between those settled before verdict and those terminated by judgment; a visual inspection
indicates that about as many were settled before verdict as afterward. DOT, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION 29-30 (1970).
23. See generally ALI-ABA STUDY; W. KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 173-93; Applebaum &
McDowell, supra note 5, at 137-38; Bishop, supra note 17; Bishop, supra note 3; Hinsey &
DeLancey, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: An Approach to Its Evaluation and a
Checklist, 23 Bus. LAW. 869 (1968); Hinsey, DeLancey, Stahl & Kramer, What Existing D &
0 Policies Cover, 27 Bus. LAW. 147 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972); Mace, Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance, 85 BANKING L.J. 39 (1968); Scott, Fearsand Phobiasin Thrift Institutions,
88 BANKING L.J. 124 (1970); Note, Public Policyand Directors'Liability Insurance,67 COLUM.
L. REV. 716 (1967); Note, Liability Insurancefor Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. REV. 648
(1967); Wall St. J., June 29, 1966, at I, col. 6.
24. See ALI-ABA STUDY 5-8; Bishop, supra note 17, at 103.
25. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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demonstrated how ordinary businessmen could become personally
liable for the aggregate amount of a stock or bond flotation.
No data seem to be available on the number of corporations
carrying this type of insurance, but casual conversations with corporation counsel indicate that such insurance is nearly universal among
publicly-held companies.2 6 A typical answer to an inquiry is "of
course we take officers' and directors' liability insurance. Anybody
would be crazy to be a director for a company that does not." Although Professor Bishop has attacked this attitude as unsound, his
2
observations serve to confirm that this point of view is prevalentY.
Liability insurance protects directors and officers in two ways.
Policies are normally written both to insure the corporation against
expenses of indemnification and to insure the officers and directors
against payments on accounts of liability, including attorneys' fees
and other costs of defense.2 One effect of the insurance is therefore
to facilitate a company's indemnification of its directors, since, with
the exception of premium costs, the company no longer bears the
expense of indemnification. The other effect is to reduce the amount
which the directors might otherwise have to pay in those cases where
the corporation is unwilling to indemnify.
However, the use of insurance implies that directors will have to
pay something, because the standard form of policy provides for a
deductible amount to be borne entirely by the insureds and for apportionment of the risk above this amount in a ratio of 95 percent for
the insurer and 5 percent for the insured. The insured, of course, bears
the entire loss beyond the policy limits, and policy clauses generally
forbid the corporation to indemnify the directors for the uncovered
2
liabilitiesY.
It is unclear to what extent corporations will choose to indemnify
their directors without utilizing insurance, thus relieving directors of
100 percent of their costs, and to what extent they will call on insurance, with the consequence of relieving the directors of only 95 per26. See Bishop, supra note 3, at 1079 n.4. See note 27 infra.
27. Vincent Stahl, speaking in March, 1969, stated that he was surprised to find that 50
percent of a sample of large corporations were carrying such insurance. ALI-ABA STUDY 8.
In December, 1970, it was reported that 93 of 144 respondent manufacturing companies were
insured. Fisher & Brown, Some Consequences of Directors' Liability, CONFERENcE BOARD
RECORD, Dec., 1970, at 30.
28. For an analysis of policy terms, see ALI-ABA STUDY 70-99. See also the sample clauses
set forth in the appendix of that study.
29. See Hinsey, DeLancey, Stahl & Kramer, supra note 23, at 148-49, 157-58. Sample
clauses are set forth in ALI-ABA STUDY A-3, A-14, A-21.
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cent of their liability. It is probable that both methods will be used,
so that, in the end, directors will be relieved of between 95 and 100
percent of the losses for which they are liable.
3. Refusal to serve. If the available indemnification procedures
and insurance coverage do not provide a sense of security, people may
refuse to serve as directors.3 ° A frequent observation of corporate
counsel is that respected directors are harder to obtain these days. In
practice, this seems to mean that many directorial candidates initially
decline to serve and can be persuaded to do so only by assurances that
the company carries liability insurance to protect them and by the
existence of a substantial level of directors' fees. When these considerations fail to persuade a potential director, the explanations for the
failure are often that insurance does not cover all risks, it never pays
for the time lost if a liability suit is brought, and it is inherently
incapable of neutralizing the injury to prestige and peace of mind
occasioned by a liability suit.
Ironically, indemnification and insurance may even aggravate the
danger of lost time, reputation, and composure caused by liability
suits. As juries and judges become aware that the amounts which they
assess against directors are not taken from the defendants' personal
wealth, there is a likelihood that larger sums will be awarded, further
stimulating the litigiousness of plaintiffs' attorneys.
Unfortunately, it is not certain that the nominees who refuse to
serve are the least competent ones, as hypothesized in the "idealistic
model" presented above. 31 The greater the wealth and reputation of
a candidate, the less willing he may be to assume a position of risk.
The quality of "prudence," so valued in a money manager, is highly
incompatible with incurring risks of million-dollar liabilities. An enterprise with stains on its corporate history and badly in need of
better advisers may thus be peculiarly handicapped in procuring competent directors.
Some critics of directors' liability insurance seem to assume that
the right kind of director would be one who would have no fear of
liability, because he would plan to exercise due care. By similar reasoning, the right kind of automobile driver would be one who fails
to carry automobile liability insurance, because he intends to have no
accidents.
4. Buildingpaper shelters. Another probable avoidance response
30. See Cary & Harris, supra note 4; Farrell & Murphy, supra note 15.
31. See pages 897-98 supra.
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to the threat of liability claims is to expend great effort on establishing a record of diligence. Directors may refuse to make decisions
unless they are supplied with opinions of accountants certifying the
accuracy of financial statements, appraisers' estimates of the value
of properties, forecasts by management i onsultants of profit prospects, engineers' analyses of production costs, and lawyers' opinions
about the legality of a course of conduct. Directors may insist, as a
condition of affirmative action, that the documents take strong positive views of a proposed course, so as to prove on any later audit that
the directors used "due diligence." 3 Such an attitude would force
managers to find and use consultants who tend more toward optimism than toward candor and illumination. In this way, the fear of
liability may tend to degrade, rather than to elevate, the decisional
processes of directors.
5. Intensification of diligence. Finally, the menace of liability
may increase diligence, of which there are many types. Diligence in
a motorist may take the form of watching more alertly to avoid
impacts with other vehicles, or watching more alertly to avoid violating traffic rules such as stop signals, speed limits and median lines,
or watching more alertly for police who might detect violations of
traffic rules. In somewhat parallel fashion, one might compare diligence in maximizing profits, diligence in avoiding losses, diligence in
avoiding participation in crucial decisions, diligence in creating an
appearance of diligence in whatever decisions are made, and diligence
in establishing programs of indemnification and insurance which will
avoid liability when mistakes occur.
It seems quite likely that the directors in the leading cases of
liability 33 would think that their errors had resulted from their zeal
in trying to keep the company afloat in difficult times, rather than
from any laxity. Consequently, these directors would be less likely to
try to improve the quality of their decisions than to shelter themselves
by procedural precautions, indemnification and insurance. A director
found liable is somewhat in the position of a basketball player who
is booed by the crowd. He may become more tense, but he knows no
better how to get the ball into the basket than he did before the
hooting began.
The principal occasion for improved diligence as a consequence
32. See Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 5, at 134-36.
33. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp.
of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
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of liability arises when a failure has disclosed a particular procedure
which should have been employed to reduce risk. For-example, In re
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 34 taught accountants to make field
checks of inventory, and taught directors to require that accountants
certify to having made those field checks. This procedure is helpful
if embezzlers obligingly persist in the same routines of deception, but
of embezzlers who
it does not cope effectively with the inventiveness
3
1
tanks.
oil
salad
of
gauges
the
falsify
to
manage
A current opportunity to evaluate the diligence stimulated by
liability is presented by the "due diligence" procedures developed in
response to the BarChrisdisaster. To a large extent these procedures
consist of procuring written statements from lawyers, accountants
'36
and others for the sole purpose of showing "due diligence.
The extent of net gain resulting from an increased perception of
the liability threat is enigmatic. Cerfainly, directors are trying harder
to be diligent. Some directors certainly deliberate more carefully and
reach sounder conclusions than they would if not threatened with
liability; others certainly give increased attention to routines of verification which divert their attention from solving the company's problems toward a ritual of regularity. This writer would guess that liability enhances the latter tendency more than the former, but each
reader should make his own conjecture.
Stalling the Liability Machine
Aside from the ingenuity of mankind in avoiding the application
of any penalty, there are usually a number of obstacles in the processes through which the penalty is applied which prevent it from
working, even when no active avoidance devices are employed. Legal
principles are like home-made bombs, which often fail to ignite even
if they are not intercepted by the police. Discussed below are some
of the reasons why the rule of directors' liability frequently remains
inactivated even without active obstruction.
1. Nobody knows. There is nothing to make it immediately evident when a directorial error has caused a corporate loss, or when a
registration statement has been materially false. Where suits against
directors have been brought, they have often followed an exposure by
34. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940), reprinted in 4 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 11 72020-37 (1964).
35. Ameco Salad Oil Swindle, FORBES, Dec. I, 1965, at 20.
36. See Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 5, at 131-38.
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a congressional committee or an investigation report of a governmental commission. 7
2. Corporations don't cry. When corporate directors learn that
some of them have made a mistake, it usually means that all of them
are responsible for the mistake since directors act collectively. Directors probably share the general human disinclination to recognize
one's own mistakes, the stronger disinclination to regard the mistakes
as negligent, and the still stronger tendency to doubt that losses which
have occurred resulted from the mistakes they made. Even when
directors clearly perceive that they have negligently caused a loss, it
may appear to them that to enforce the corporation's right against
themselves would occasion the even greater cost of dissuading themselves, or equally gifted substitutes, from consenting to serve.
This obstacle may, of course, be avoided in various circumstances. If the corporation has become insolvent, the decision to sue
may be made by a trustee in bankruptcy, who is subject to quite
different tensions. 8 If the guilty managers have sold out their interest,3" the new management will feel no inhibitions about suing the
old. However, merely to mention these cases suggests their exceptional nature.
The obstacle of the corporation's disinclination to sue directors
is only partially circumvented by the right of a shareholder to bring
a derivative suit. The exercise of this right is impeded in the same way
as that of a securities buyer to sue for a false registration statement-that is, by the improbability that an outside shareholder will
discover the key error.
3. Expense of investigation,preparationand suit. Very few share37. The suit in Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940), for example, was closely
related to facts regarding J.P. Morgan's financial operations exposed by official investigations.
Recent suits against investment company advisors for excessive fees also seem to be related to
SEC studies of mutual funds.
38. A receiver brought the action in Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Cf
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966), where a receiver

intervened in an action brought by a stockholders' committee which was formed by a director.
An instance of current interest is related in N.Y. Times, Feb. II, 1972, at 47, col. 6.

39. An example of this phenomenon is evident in the "looting" cases. See Insuranshares
Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), where the corporation, under
new management, sued the former principal shareholders as well as one of the directors.
Insuransharesindicates the possibility of the corporation's suing for negligence, although the

suit in that case was actually for restitution of an illicit profit on sale of control. It is rare, of
course, that the corporation survives the looting. Accordingly, other looting suits have been
brought by bankruptcy trustees or liquidators. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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holders, even if rich and powerful, would invest money in the hazard
of a suit against directors. The preparation of such a suit always
involves expensive investigation and hundreds of hours of legal study.
Thus, such suits are brought chiefly when lawyers are willing to invest, at their own risk, the necessary hours of investigation and preparation. In several important states, preparation involves organizing
whose aggregate holdings are worth at least
a mass of shareholders
40
dollars.
thousand
50
Although some lawyers are willing to make the investment for
such suits, they are likely to do so only when the probable rewards
of success are rather high and can be perceived to be high even before
the investigation is begun. This factor serves to diminish the proportion of detected malfeasances which are likely to be prosecuted by
complainants.
Transaction Costs
Coercive measures generally involve high transaction costs 41 since
people do not willingly give up their money or their freedom. Directors' liability cases are no exception. Some data on the amounts of
attorneys' fees in this area are available because the fees of successful
plaintiffs' attorneys are usually assessed against the corporation by
court order. Professor Hornstein determined from a survey of court
records that the average allowance for all expenses was about 20
percent of the benefit conferred on the corporation. The percentage
allowed was lower for the larger recoveries and higher for the smaller
ones.4 2 Some very large awards have been made, such as the
$1,876,000 recovery in Zenn v. Anzalone,4 3 a case which involved
Alleghany Corporation's control of Investors' Diversified Services,
Inc. The percentage in these cases is calculated not simply on money
paid over, but on prospective future gains as well. In Zenn, most of
40. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1970). For a survey and analysis of other statutes, see 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 722 (1959).

41. For earlier comments on transaction costs in relation to tort claims, see CONARD, et

al. 102-04; T. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY 28 (1967); Calabresi, The Fault System and
Accident Costs, 33 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 429, 437-39 (1968); Vickery, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalitiesand Insurance, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 464, 482-83 (1968).
42. See 2 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 253. Data are also available in F. WOOD, supra

note 21, at 79-81. Since these figures relate to settlements made prior to the development of
the rule requiring court approval of counsel fees, they cannot be presumed to indicate current
practice.
43. 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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the predicted benefit consisted of the value of giving the benefited
corporation control of another by changing its shares from nonvoting to voting shares. 4
In addition to plaintiffs' collection costs, corresponding expenses
are incurred by the defense, whether borne by the individual defendants, by the corporations of which they are directors, or by liability
insurers. Data on these costs are not a matter of record, and can only
be estimated. They include the costs of defense not only in the cases
where plaintiffs prevail but also in the numerous cases where the
plaintiffs fail and their lawyers obtain nothing. 5 In the aggregate,
defense expenses seem likely to be as great as claimants' expenses,
although to be on the safe side one might estimate them to be 10
percent of the benefits conferred by payments and settlements. Defensive and offensive expenses combined must, therefore, be equal to at
least 30 percent of the benefits received by corporations and investors
on account of directors' negligence liability.
When directors' liability is covered by insurance, the transactional
costs increase by the costs of insurance acquisition and administration. These costs vary with different kinds of insurance and are conveniently viewed as the "retained premium"-that is, the fraction of
the premium which the company does not pay out in benefits or
settlements. In automobile liability insurance, the retained fraction
is approximately 40 percent. In fidelity insurance, which resembles
directors' liability insurance in that it is concerned with employees'
misfeasance, the retention rises to approximately 50 percent. In
suretyship, it reaches approximately 65 percent."
44. The benefit attributed to the control value of exchanging non-voting for voting shares
was variously estimated at eleven to nineteen, eight, five and one-half, or over five million
dollars. Id. at 748-49.
45. The report in F. WOOD, supra note 21, indicates that 36 percent of the derivative suits
reported on were dismissed, and 28 percent were discontinued. The latter figure presumably
means "discontinued without settlement," since there were other classifications for "settled"
cases. Thus, 64 percent of the terminated cases appear to have been wholly unsuccessful. These
percentages have been calculated from the raw numbers, however, and thus differ from those
offered by the report itself.
46. The premium retention is most conveniently obtained by finding the loss ratio and
determining its complement. The aggregate loss ratio of automobile bodily injury liability
insurance underwritten by major stock companies in 1968 was 61.9 percent of premiums

written.

BEST'S AGGREGATES

& AVERAGES:

PROPERTY-LIABILITY

131 (1968). However, total

expenses and losses were 103 percent of premiums. Since premiums over an extended period
must cover expenses, it is appropriate to read the retention as the remainder of 103, rather than
of 100. Thus, we find a retention rate of (103 - 61.9) divided by 103, which equals 40 percent.
47. Id. at 137.

48. Id. at 138.
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No published figures are available on loss ratios in officers' and
directors' liability insurance. Even if available, such figures would not
be decisive because experience with this line of underwriting is limited. One can assume, however, that the premium retention will be
high because this form of liability insurance coverage is quite uncompetitive. Very few companies are offering directors' liability insurance, and so there is very little competitive pressure on premiums. 9
Under present circumstances, it seems likely that the retention
rate will be at least 50 percent; of the remaining 50 percent paid out
in settlements, claimants' lawyers will probably retain one fifth,5" so
that the net benefits may be approximately 40 percent of the premium
costs.
The premiums are usually paid in the ratio of 90 percent from the
corporation and 10 percent from the directors." However, the necessity of paying premiums necessarily increases the costs of being a
director, and it seems likely that directors' fees are increased, even if
not explicitly, to the extent necessary to pay the premiums. Consequently, all the premiums are paid at the ultimate expense of the
persons interested in the corporation. In a healthy corporation, this
means principally at the expense of the shareholders; to the extent
that the executives share profits, such payment would also be at their
expense. In corporations which are experiencing financial difficulties,
the expense may be ultimately borne by creditors, suppliers and employees, all of whom suffer in various ways from the ill fortunes of
the enterprise.
The Redistribution of Losses

One of the principal benefits which is claimed for other types of
liability systems is that losses are"redistributed from an injury victim
to others.52 This function has been most extensively studied in connection with automobile injuries.5 3 In the absence of insurance, the
49. See Hinsey, DeLancey, Stahl & Kramer, supra note 23, at 155-56.
50. See 2 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 253.
51. See Bishop, supra note 3, at 1090.
52. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 13.1-.7 (1956). The theory, which is
generally traced to Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923), was subjected to
a particularly insightful critique in Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). See also CONARD, et al. 75-107.
53. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW
PROBLEM (1965); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile
Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279 (1964).
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payment of damages purports to shift loss from an injured person to
someone else. But since average citizens are virtually judgment-proof,
the shift takes place only when the "someone else" has more than
average resources; the result is generally a shifting of resources from
the richer to the poorer. This consequence is particularly attractive
when the claimant is disabled and destitute, as in severe injury cases.
The greatest benefits of redistribution are seen, however, in the
presence of liability insurance. In these cases, the losses will be borne
eventually by the large community of premium payers, so that they
will bear more lightly on each insured than on the particular injury
victim.54 Redistribution of personal injury losses is a "humanitarian"
gain because the premium expenses of all drivers are less painful than
the sudden destitution of a disabled worker or orphaned family. Since
premium payments are associated with automobile ownership, the
visible costs of automobile ownership are increased, thus leading to
a more accurate social cost accounting, which in turn leads to a more
55
beneficial allocation of resources.
The remainder of this section will consider how this type of analysis applies to directors' liability when coupled with indemnification
procedures or with liability insurance.
1. Redistribution without indemnity or insurance. If directors'
liability is enforced without indemnification or insurance, loss is
shifted from the corporation or its investors to the directors. The
payment to compensate for the loss is likely to be rather small in
proportion to the loss for either of two reasons. Directors' resources
are usually small in comparison with the losses which their mistakes
can cause; furthermore, liability claims are likely to be compromised
at a fraction of the losses sustained because of the legal uncertainties
of enforcement.5 6
At the same time, corporations or investors who enforce the claim
are likely to incur considerable legal expense; their net benefit will
not be over four-fifths of the disappointing sums collected.57 In a
54. See

CONARD,

et al. 97-99.

55. This aspect is emphasized by Calabresi, supra note 52. See also CONARD, et a! 92-97.
56. No reliable data have been discovered with respect to the ratio of repayments to claimed
or estimated losses in cases of directors' liability. In automobile negligence, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that when losses are substantial, payments are usually a small fraction
thereof. One survey, for example, showed an average payment of 30 percent of losses over
$25,000. J. VOLPE, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES

36 (1971). Another study showed that the median victim of over $25,000 in losses

collected less than 25 percent of the total loss. CONARD, et aL 179.
57. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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more remote way, the corporations and investors who are benefited
by the recovery may suffer increased costs in inducing directors to
serve in the future because the corporation may have to increase
directors' fees or buy insurance coverage. In the end, the loss shift
from the corporation and its investors as a class will be minimal.
Even the situation of particular investors who collect proceeds from
a suit against directors will probably not be noticeably improved.
2. Redistribution when liability is indemnified. The shifting of

loss incidence is further diminished if directors' liabilities are indemnified. In the case of a director's liability to the corporation itself, the
circularity is complete-that is, the corporation pays back whatever
it collects, plus a substantial legal expense. In the case of liability
under the securities laws to a purchaser of stock, the ultimate burden
of the loss is borne by the whole body of shareholders in the corporation-of which the plaintiff is probably a part.
3. Redistribution when liability is insured. When the losses of the

corporation or of its investors are covered by insurance, there is a
preliminary shift of loss from the corporation or the securities buyers
to the insurers along with an augmentation of loss through litigation
and insurance expenses. However, since the insurers are compensated
by the premiums of all the corporations who buy insurance, the loss
is redistributed ultimately from one corporation or group of investors
to a wider group of corporations and investors. The ultimate burden
consists not only of the loss itself but of the added litigation and
insurance costs.
4. Social advantages of redistribution.Social advantages of loss

redistribution are harder to discern in relation to corporations and
investors than in relation to personal injury victims. If the losses of
Guaranty Trust Company's shareholders" had been shifted to other
trust companies by means of insurance, it is not evident that the
shareholders of the other companies would have been better able to
bear the losses than were Guaranty's own shareholders. By diminishing proportionately the profits of all insurance-buying trust companies, the attractiveness of trust company stocks would have decreased, although not by any perceptible amount. Prospective buyers
of such stocks might have learned the same lesson simply by contemplating the lowered earnings of Guaranty Trust.
Greater advantages of loss redistribution may be found in
58. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America.59 In that case, the corpo-

ration failed because of the directors' failure to shift the plant to a
more suitable facility, despite the fact that a prospectus had promised
such a relocation. If the directors' liability had been fully insured, the
bankrupt estate would have been significantly augmented to the benefit of creditors. At the same time, shareholders in other companies
would have lost profits to the extent of the insurance premiums which
their respective companies had paid. If the creditors of Manganese
were unpaid laborers, there might have been a humanitarian gain. If
the creditors were principally bondholders or mining companies, the
humanitarian gain would have been negligible.
Gains in the accuracy of social cost accounting as a result of loss
distribution are even more elusive. By virtue of the loss shift, and the
resulting increased costs of doing business, shares of all insurancebuying companies would become somewhat less attractive, and the
shares in Manganese, or any such corporation, would become slightly
more attractive. Thus, it appears that social cost accounting is impaired more than it is improved.
Perhaps the most favorable example of loss redistribution by insurance would be found in a case similar to BarChris.0 The initial
loss in that case fell on the buyers of the misdescribed debentures. If
the liability had been insured, the loss would have been redistributed
among the shareholders of other corporations which bought similar
insurance. To the extent of the shift, the perils of buying debentures
would be diminished, and the rewards of owning stock in insurancebuying companies would be reduced. If the debenture-buyers were
widows and orphans, a humanitarian gain would result. If the buyers
were pension funds, which is more likely, the loss shift from one
group of investors to another would seem to have negligible social
advantages. Considering the fact that the costs are doubled or tripled
in the process of redistributing them, the social gain may even be
negative.
AN

ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE OF DIRECTORS' LIABILITY

Although directors' liability seems to operate in a clumsy and
expensive way, it does not necessarily deserve to be abolished. Even
a very small percentage of improvement in the wisdom of directors'
59. 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
60. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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decisions would be well worth buying. Indeed, in a trillion-dollar
corporate-oriented economy, it is clear that even a minimal improvement in the wisdom of directorial decision making would be well
worth achieving.
However, the low net output of the system suggests that it may
be desirable to devise a more efficient mechanism for achieving the
same goals. There is an immense waste in litigating over milliondollar liabilities, with lawyers' fees in proportion, when only a tiny
fraction of the redistribution operates to punish directors or to benefit
injured investors.
To eliminate the waste, and vitalize the deterrent, it would be
sufficient to abolish indemnification and insurance. However, this
approach would deter responsible persons from serving as directors.
The objective, therefore, must be to find a means of dispensing with
indemnification and insurance, while simultaneously restraining the
destructive effects of the deterrent.
An imaginable solution would be a return to the legal principles
of a less complicated era, when Judges Holmes and Hand applied the
"business judgment rule."'" Although their decisions were probably
wiser than analyses which attempt to assess the entire corporate loss
against each single director, their results will not provide satisfaction
today. Few modern judges share the faith of Holmes and Hand that
businessmen will do well enough if left to themselves; the Selheimer"
case illustrates a more contemporary judicial approach, and the Securities Act63 a more contemporary legislative view. If these developments have not annihilated the "business judgment rule," this legal
doctrine received its coup de grace in the recent decision granting
plaintiffs in derivative cases a right to jury trial. 4
The solution, if there is one, must be to reduce the extent of
director liability to the amount which a prudent man is willing to
risk." The difficulty arises from the fact that courts have mechanically applied to directors' liability the classic measure of damages
evolved in tort law-that is, the full measure of loss resulting from
the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct. 6
61. Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
62. Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
63. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a etseq. (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
64. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
65. Cf.Ruder, Wheat & Loss, supra note 5, at 89.
66. This is the principle of the landmark case, In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560, whereby
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The necessity of reducing the extent of director liability is evidenced by the current form of liability insurance, with its upper and
lower limits and coinsurance in the middle.67 Professor Loss also
acknowledges the necessity of setting a limit on individual liability-$25,000-in the current revision of the federal securities acts. "
Whether the liability limit (and the insurance deductible) is set at
$5,000 or at $25,000, the limit will be derisively small in some cases,
and draconically large in others. In order to be effective but not
catastrophic, the measure of liability must stand in a proper relation
to what a director gains from his position. If his annual fees of
$10,000 drop to $5,000 after taxes, his maximum liability could be
limited to this amount. Perhaps it should be twice this amount, or
perhaps one-half, but it should vary depending upon the director's
compensation. For the director who is motivated by financial considerations, this limit should be sufficient; for others, it is irrelevant.
The risk of losing one's annual compensation would also bear
very differently on outside than on inside directors. Since outside
directors are presumed to have some other primary source of income,
the loss of their directors' fees would mean only that such directors
had rendered a gratuitous service. For inside directors, who are not
presumed to have substantial outside income, the loss would be much
more serious; but since insiders are directly dependent upon the wellbeing of the corporation, they also have much greater incentives to
bear the risk.
To carry out this plan, Congress could pass a law limiting the
negligence liability of a director in a registered corporation " to his
net after-tax income from the corporation for the year in which one
or more violations of duty occurred. This might result in a liability
of $5,000 for an outside director and $100,000 for an officer-director.
At the same time, the statute would forbid indemnification of such
liabilities, as well as prohibit insurance coverage against them. The
law should cover not only the federal securities laws but also state
the careless stevedore who struck a spark was liable for blowing up a ship.
67. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion or policy terms, see

ALI-ABA

STUDY.

68. See Ruder, Wheat & Loss, supra note 5, at 89.
69. "Registered" companies should include all those registered under section 12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), by reason of assets exceeding
$1,000,000 and shareholders exceeding 500, companies whose securities are registered on a
stock exchange under section 12(b) of the same statute, and investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (1970).
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securities laws and common-law principles of negligence and fiduciary duty. This coverage is appropriate because interstate corporations need to be liberated from the dual entanglements of catastrophic directors' liabilities and the expensive but useless encumbrances of indemnification and insurance. Like other federal liabilities, this form of directors' liability should be assertable by a shareholder without the impediment of state law requirements of contemporaneous shareholding and security for expenses. Payment of indemnification and insurance premiums would stop, but this would
have no noticeable effect on corporate profits.
The effect of such a law would be to reduce immensely the amount
of litigation over negligence. Since prospects of million-dollar verdicts would no longer exist, there would be no point in either side's
incurring a quarter of a million dollars in legal expenses. As a result,
questions of director negligence would be settled much more expeditiously and cheaply.
The total effect of the change on liability suits cannot be estimated without considering at the same time what would be done with
regard to directors' liability for illicit profits obtained through selfdealing, short term trading, or trading on inside information. This
engaging study would require another article as long as the present
one. Consequently, the complete design of a legislative reform and a
model of its aftermath must be left for another occasion.
AN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE STRUCTURE: No FAULT?

Since directors' liability insurance tends to spread the costs of
directors' mistakes throughout the community of corporate investors,
one is tempted to consider a system of "no-fault" insurance whereby
corporations would simply insure themselves and their investors
against loss. However, "loss" is too undefineable to lend itself to
insurance coverage. To give the coverage any effective definition, it
would have to be restricted to losses caused by blamable mistakes,
which takes us right back to directors' liability insurance.
Perhaps a no-fault coverage could be designed for securities flotations which are accompanied by material misrepresentations, as in
70. For a vigorous advocacy of the no-fault insurance idea in automobile accidents, see J.
94-105
(1971). See also R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965); Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting the
Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DUKE L.J. 331.
O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE
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the BarChris case. It is hardly conceivable that buyers could be protected against all losses for all time on condition of finding a flaw in
the registration statement. It is conceivable, however, that buyers
could be insured against a market loss of more than 50 percent within
twelve months if a misrepresentation were discovered within that
time. This result would have the merit of mitigating the most unexpected losses of many investors. The cost would be borne by the entire
community of security buyers, augmented by the expenses of insurance underwriting and administration. The function of this type of
insurance would be similar to that of Federal Deposit Insurance on
bank accounts. To deter misrepresentation, we would rely on administrative remedies-for example, stop orders-and on criminal penalties.
If security buyers were like bank depositors-embracing the rank
and file of humanity and relying on their securities as their principal
shelter against a rainy day-such insurance could be recommended.
If, however, security buyers are generally among the financially
stronger individuals and institutions, with their own programs of
diversification, they would probably be better off bearing their own
risks. The latter hypothesis seems more likely to be true, and no-fault
insurance for directors' errors appears to be a needless encumbrance
on the money markets.
ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

More hopeful than restructuring liability damages and liability
insurance are the possibilities of increasing the incentives for optimum performance by directors. With respect to other employees,
everyone would agree that performance is more likely to be improved
by rewards than the threat of fines, which are seldom used today
except against fractious baseball players. Athletes, artists, musicians,
scholars and politicians usually find their incentives in promotions
and pay raises rather than in fear of punishment administered
through civil liability. Similarly, there are many ways in which the
good performances of directors can be rewarded, instead of, or in
addition to, penalizing their errors.
This article is not the place to describe a whole new system of
management, but it is a good place to indicate some of the ways in
which incentives for director excellence could be enhanced. One must
bear these possibilities in mind in order to place negligence liability
in its proper perspective.
The first step in optimizing director behavior is to define direc-
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tors' tasks in ways which are attainable. Prevailing corporation statutes provide that directors shall "manage the business" of the corporation. However, management in any meaningful sense is impossible
for outside directors, since they cannot familiarize themselves with
corporate affairs sufficiently to be effective decision-makers. Their
function, rather, is to decide whether the inside directors are doing a
reasonably good job.71 For example, outside directors should not
participate in management decisions, such as whether to buy Missouri Pacific bonds, 72 or to move the manganese plant from Paterson
to Colwyn. 73 By not participating, they would avoid the risk of liability. For similar reasons, outside directors should not be liable for
misstatements in registration statements; they should not even be
permitted to sign them, in view of their inadequate basis for certifying
the statements' accuracy. They should, however, retain liability for
failing to remove incompetent directors, or failing to call for investigation of symptoms of malfunction.
The principal incentives for diligence of outside directors should
be found in their relations to those whom they represent. The difficulty at present is that most outside directors represent the officers,
who have chosen them through the proxy system. From these electors, they can seldom win plaudits for criticism, and never for suggesting a change of leadership. 74 Therefore, if outside directors are to
perform their function of providing independent judgment, they must
be chosen by investors, not by officers, and must be regarded as
investors' representatives. Despite all that has been said about "proxy
control," many directors are chosen today by outsiders, such as investment bankers or other corporations holding substantial blocks of
stock. Unfortunately, rules have grown up which inhibit these directors from regarding themselves as representatives. For example, a
shareholder who is represented by an outside director becomes liable
for short-term trades under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 75 This circumstance precludes active participation in control by
71. See Bunting, Conard, Deutsch, Farrell & Hickman, The Corporate Machinery for
Hearingand Heeding New Voices, 27 Bus. LAW. 195, 214-16 (1971); Conard, Mace, Blough
& Gibson, Functions of Directors Under the Existing System, 27 Bus. LAW. 32 (Special Issue,
Feb. 1972).
72. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
73. See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
74. See Conard, Mace, Blough & Gibson, supra note 71, at 35-36, 41-46.
75. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970).
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the most powerful and best qualified stockholders-the institutional
investors. There are also dangers of liability under "controlling persons" provisions of the securities acts.7 6 These provisions are major
obstacles to effective control of large publicly-held corporations.
They should be repealed or constricted if shareholder control of corporations is to be a reality.
These changes in the roles of outside directors would require a
considerable change in statutory law. The clean-cut method would be
to establish a supervisory council of outsiders, a system which has
long existed in Germany and is gaining favor throughout the European communities.7 7 A more gradual approach in the same direction
could be made by statutory recognition of an "auditing committee"
in the board, with decreased responsibility for active management
7
and increased powers of control. 1
With respect to "inside directors," who are the executive officers,
incentives for optimum performance could be provided by subjecting
them to the effective control of a supervisory council or auditing
committee. This approach would require removing the proxy power
from the executives and placing it in the hands of the outsiders. The
supervisory council or auditing committee would then be in a position
to reward the executives for excellence by retaining them in office (the
principal incentive of public officials), by promoting them (the usual
incentive of non-executive employees), or by the bonuses and stock
options which are traditional incentives for executives. These rewards
would, however, be determined by an evaluation of performance,
rather than by swings in the economic cycle which are often unrelated
to excellence.
If observers of the corporate scene became convinced that executives are subject to effective and independent supervision, they might
willingly accept a diminution or even an abandonment of the clumsy
threat of liability for damages. It is largely the lack of faith in other
76. Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970), in conjunction with
section 5, prohibits a controlling person from selling securities without a prospectus except
within narrow limits set by rule. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78t (1970), imposes a prima facie liability on controlling persons for securities violations by persons controlled.
77. German Stock Corporation Act, Laws of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI 1089, 1185, See
also French Law on Commercial Companies, Law of July 24, 1966, [19661 J.O. 6402. See
generally Vagts, The European System, 27 Bus. LAW. 165 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972), Vagts,
Reforming the "Modern" Corporation:Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23
(1966).
78. Cary & Harris, supra note 4, at 72-73, citing ONTARIO Bus. CORP. AcT § 182 (1970).
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controls over directors which inspires critics to complain so bitterly
of the indemnification and insurance devices which presently emasculate the liability threat."
CONCLUSION

The simple principle of directors' liability for negligence-designed to punish directors and compensate injured investors-presently functions with pathetic inefficiency and sometimes
not at all. Substantial sums of money are invested in making the
principle work, but it is like a propellor so fouled with seaweed that
it no longer moves the ship, regardless of the power input. The fouling
is primarily caused by indemnification and insurance, which are supplied at the expense of the same people, or some of the same people,
who are supposed to be benefited. Since aggregate net benefits are
slight in relation to costs, investors as a whole are more harmed than
helped.
The problem cannot be solved simply by taking away indemnification and insurance; such a development would result not in getting
better directors, but in getting worse ones-those who are indifferent
to potentially bankrupting liabilities. If liability is to work efficiently,
a scaling down of the limits of liability must be initiated simultaneously with elimination of indemnification and insurance. The measure of damages should be related to directors' compensation, rather
than to corporations' or investors' losses.
But liability is a blunt instrument at best. A more positive way
of stimulating directors' excellence is to provide them with a highly
qualified, completely independent supervisory board or auditing committee. To be independent, such a board or committee would have
to be chosen by investors, without the interposition of officers, as
proxy-holders or otherwise. Active investor participation might be
stimulated by liberating the big shareholders, including institutional
investors, from liabilities which would now threaten them if they
exercised active control over the corporations in which they have
placed their funds.
79. See Bishop, supra note 3.

